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It is well-known in the literature that income per capita is strongly correlated with the level of
democracy across countries. In an inuential paper, Acemoglu et al. (2008) nd that this linear
correlation disappears once they control for country-specic eects focusing on within-country
variation. In this paper we nd evidence of a non-linear eect from income to democracy even
after controlling for country-specic eects. While a positive eect emerges for poor countries,
this eect vanishes for rich countries.
JEL Codes: D72, E21, C23.
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1 Introduction
More than 23 centuries ago, Aristotle already discussed economic prosperity as one of the factors
that stimulate democracy (Aristotle, 1932); he argued that only in a wealthy society with relatively
few people living in real poverty could democracy arise and irresponsible demagogues be avoided.
This discussion was further developed and formalized by Lipset (1959), and thus this idea is often
called the Lipset hypothesis. There is a number of mechanisms that could explain this eect, as
for example increased education and an enlarged middle class (Lipset, 1959). The cross-country
evidence examined in Barro (1999) conrms that the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis is a strong empirical
regularity.
However, in a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2008) nd evidence against this hypothesis. In
particular, after controlling for factors that simultaneously aect both income and democracy (i.e.
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1country-specic xed heterogeneity), they nd that there is no evidence of a linear eect of income
on democracy. They interpret this result as evidence in favor of the idea that societies embarked on
divergent political-economic development paths at certain critical junctures in the distant past.
In this paper we revisit this hypothesis and nd evidence in favor of an heterogeneous eect
of income on democracy (heterogeneous across levels of income) even after controlling for country-
specic eects in the framework of Acemoglu et al. (2008). More concretely, we nd that the poorest
countries in the world might be beneted in terms of higher democracy standards from an increase
in income. However, once a certain level of economic development is reached, this eect vanishes.
As it is pointed out in North (1990), institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. That institutions aect
the performance of economies is hardly controversial. It is then plausible that economies with good
performances, in order to maintain the status quo, are going to be less prone to change their rules
than economies with poor performances.
Figure 1 provides enlightening evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In particular, Figure 1 plots
democracy1 against log GDP per capita for rich an poor countries separately.2 In order to control for
factors that simultaneously aect income and democracy in levels (i.e. country-specic eects), both
variables are expressed in deviations from country-specic time means so that only within country
variation is plotted.3 When we consider rich countries the within-country correlation between income
and democracy is surprisingly weak. But on the other hand, when we consider poor countries, there
is a strong positive within-country association between both indicators. This informal evidence
suggests that the eect of income on democracy is not constant for every level of income, giving
support to our working hypothesis: despite economic prosperity positively inuences the democracy
level in poor countries, once a certain threshold of economic development is reached this inuence
disappears.
Usually, linearity is taken to be a convenient and homogeneous local approximation of a more
general model. However, in this context we are interested in the comparison of very dierent groups
of countries. If the eect of income on institutions is larger for poor countries than for rich countries,
the local approximation is no longer tenable and the linear estimates might be biased. In view
1The measure of democracy corresponds to Democracy Index minus Autocracy Index from Polity IV (see the Data
section for more details).
2Poor countries in Figure 1 are those in the bottom 80% of the income distribution in a given year (see the gure
for more details). Although only the top-2 deciles might be a very restrictive group, it represents a large number of
countries. It includes at least one observation of Antigua, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. This ad hoc partition of the
sample is only for illustration and driven by the results discussed later in the paper (see Section 4). In any event, very
similar results are found using alternative denitions of poor and rich, such as 70   30 and 90   10.
3We consider here data in deviations from country-specic means due to its straightforward connection with the
xed eects estimators considered later in the paper (note that a simple OLS regression with the data in Figure 1
leads to the commonly-used xed eects estimator).
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This gure plots GDP per capita and the Polity IV index of democracy over the period 1960-
2000 for rich and poor countries. In order to consider country-specic heterogeneity we plot
the variables in deviations from its country-specic time mean. We split the sample in ten-year
periods and each country-period pair is labeled as rich (poor) if its associated GDP per capita
is above (below) the 80 percentile of the empirical cross-sectional density of this variable in a
given period. See the Data section for more details on the sample and variables. The regression
represented by the tted line in the left panel (rich countries) yields a coecient of 0:005 (standard
error = 0:005), and the regression for poor countries in the right panel yields a coecient of 0:203
(standard error = 0:049).
of the evidence presented in Figure 1, in this paper we relax the linearity assumption in order to
further investigate the relationship that connects income and democracy. More concretely, we are
interested in the measurement of the eect of income on institutions allowing for heterogeneous
eects across income levels. Using the same dataset than Acemoglu et al. (2008), we nd that
income has a signicant non-linear eect on democracy even after controlling for country-specic
unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously aecting both variables. This eect is positive for lower
values of income but it vanishes when income reaches a certain level.
Our rst strategy is to partial out unobserved xed heterogeneity in a within-group regression. By
doing this we nd a signicant non-linear relationship between income and democracy. This evidence
is equivalent to the one showed in Figure 1, but also controlling for cross-sectional correlations
(i.e. time dummies) and the lagged dependent variable to capture state dependence. Fixed eects
estimates in dynamic panels are biased when the number of time-series observations is small (e.g.
Nickell, 1981). Moreover, in this context it is controversial to give a causal interpretation to the
within-group estimates. Feedback eects from democracy to income are also present in these within-
group correlations. As in Acemoglu et al. (2008), in order to further investigate causality issues we
3consider rst-dierenced GMM (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991), nding again evidence in favor of a
non-linear eect of income on democracy.
On the other hand, it is well-known that rst-dierenced GMM estimators are poorly behaved
with persistent series such as GDP. This is so because lagged levels of the variables are only weakly
correlated with subsequent rst-dierences (e.g. Blundell and Bond, 1998). We repeat the GMM
estimation exercises using randomly generated instruments and nd that the GMM estimates remain
virtually the same; this result conrms that a problem of weak instruments is present in this particular
application. In order to alleviate this problem, we also consider the likelihood-based counterpart
of rst-dierenced GMM and conrm that our result is robust to nite sample biases due to weak
instruments. Using the LIML counterpart of the GMM Arellano-Bond estimator we nd no signicant
linear eect of income on democracy.4 On the other hand, we do nd signicant evidence in favour
of a non-linear eect, suggesting that income causes democracy only in low-income countries.
To understand if income has an eect on democracy is important for public policy decisions. If
democracy is a consequence of economic development, international policies toward countries with
authoritarian regimes should aim to foster the process of economic development, thereby hastening
the eventual replacement of authoritarian regimes with more democratic successors. By contrast, if
democracy is not caused by economic development, this may not be the route to free elections.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey describe the data. Section
3 presents the empirical strategy and discusses the main results in the paper. Section 4 analyzes the
potential problem of nite sample biases due to weak instruments and presents estimates of \causal
eects" robust to this problem. Some concluding remarks are presented in the nal Section.
2 Data
Many dierent indicators of democracy have been produced and employed in studies of comparative
politics and international economics.5 Our empirical analysis is based on the extensively used mea-
sures from the Polity Project.6 Polity IV covers the period 1800-2000 for 184 countries. Its main
advantage is that all of the indicators used in the construction of the aggregate measure are acces-
sible and well documented. According to this index, democracy reects three essential elements:
the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express preferences about
alternative policies and leaders; the existence of institutionalized constraints on the power of the
executive; and, the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens. The original index ranges between  10
(pure autocracy) and 10 (full democracy). Following earlier literature considering this variable, the
4Using the Arellano-Bond estimator, Acemoglu et al. (2008) nd a signicantly negative linear eect of income
on democracy. We argue that this result is mainly due to the small sample bias of GMM estimators.
5See Munck and Verkuilen (2002) for a survey.
6See Marshall and Jaggers (2002) for a detailed description of the main characteristics of the democracy indicators
produced by the Polity Project.
4original index is normalized to lie between 0 and 1.
In order to keep comparability of our results with Acemoglu et al. (2008), data on GDP per
capita come from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (see Heston et al., 2002). In particular, GDP per capita
is measured in constant 1996 USD at PPP. The resulting dataset represents an unbalanced panel
of 137 countries over the post-war period 1960-2000. Following the recommendation in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2003) we take as baseline the specication in which we split the sample in ten-year
periods in order to avoid business cycle eects. In any case, we also present results considering data
at ve-year intervals.
Although measurement error is an important issue in our measures of democracy and income,7
we are more aware of the consequences of the latter on the main results of the paper. This is so
because whenever the within country variation of measurement error in the dependent variable is iid
over time, it does not aect results. As the PPP adjustment of income in Penn World Tables 6.1
and 6.2 has been criticized (see Johnson et al., 2009), most of the results of the paper are replicated
using the more stable harmonization of prices presented in later version of the Penn World Tables.8
3 Non-linearities in Income and Democracy
3.1 Econometric Model
Acemoglu et al. (2008) propose to estimate the eect of income on democracy considering the
following model:
dit = dit 1 + yit 1 + t + i + vit (1)
where dit is the democracy score of country i (i = 1;:::;N) in period t (t = 1;:::;T), and yit 1 is
our variable of interest, the lagged value of log income per capita. Moreover, persistence and mean-
reverting dynamics of democracy are captured by the coecient of the lagged dependent variable on
the right-hand side. i captures country-specic xed heterogeneity potentially correlated with the
rest of variables on the right-hand side, and t represents a set of time-specic shocks to democracy
common to all countries in our sample. Finally, transitory shocks to democracy and other omitted
factors in the model are represented in the term vit.
In this linear specication, the eect of income on democracy (i.e. @dit=@yit 1 = ) is assumed to
be the same for all countries regardless of their level of income. Given the tentative evidence discussed
in the introduction, we expect an heterogeneous eect of income on democracy depending on the
income level. While democracy in rich countries might not react to changes in income, improving
income per capita in poor countries is expected to have a positive eect on their democracy standards.
7See Treier and Jackman (2008) for evidence of measurement error in the Polity IV indicator, and Johnson et al.
(2009) for inconsistencies in the PPP-adjusted measure of income presented in Penn World Table 6.1
8Results are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix.
5The simplest specication that would capture this non-linearity is based on the inclusion of a square
term of income in equation (1):
dit = dit 1 + 1yit 1 + 2y
2
it 1 + t + i + vit (2)
where now the marginal eect of income on democracy is given by
@dit
@yit 1 = 1 + 22yit 1 which
linearly depends on the level of income, and 2 describes this dependence.9 Provided 2 < 0, the
model in (2) represents a quadratic function with a maximum at y =  
1
22. Therefore, democracy
in countries with GDP per capita levels below y positively reacts to changes in income. However,
once the income threshold y is passed, this positive eect disappears.
Equations (1) and (2) might be estimated under dierent correlation structures between the the
error term t + i + vit and the regressors dit 1, yit 1, y2
it 1. In particular, we always allow for
correlation between the country-specic eects (i) and the time eects (t) with the variables on
the right hand-side (dit 1, yit 1, y2
it 1). Fixed eects estimates accommodate this correlation and are
consistent as N ! 1 and T ! 1. Pooled OLS is inconsistent in this framework which, as stated
by Acemoglu et al. (2008), "...is particularly relevant in the context of the relationship between
income and democracy because of the possibility of underlying political and social forces shaping both
equilibrium political institutions and the potential for economic growth".
With respect to the correlation between the transitory shock vit and the regressors, we consider
two dierent working hypothesis in this paper. We rst estimate the model under the strict exogeneity
assumption presented in equation (3) which implies that both lagged democracy (dit 1) and lagged
income (yit 1) are uncorrelated with the full path of shocks vi = (vi1;:::;vit;:::;viT)0:
E(vit j di;yi;t;i) = 0 (3)
where di and yi are the T 1 vectors (di1;:::;diT)0 and (yi1;:::;yiT)0. Fixed eects estimator is based
on this assumption, which given the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable does not hold by
denition because dit 1 is correlated with vis for s < t, when T is small (Nickell 1981). Moreover,
under this strict exogeneity assumption, there is no feedback from democracy to income (i.e. income
is not aected by changes in democracy).
In order to alleviate these two drawbacks of the strict exogeneity assumption in (3), we also










i are the t 11 vectors (di1;:::;dit 1)0 and (yi1;:::;yit 1)0. We label this assumption
as partial endogeneity because all past shocks up to the current period (t) (vi1;:::;vit) aect not only
9Assuming that the heterogeneity of the eect is fully described by a linear function of income might seem
restrictive a priori. Table A1 in the Appendix presents results considering a more exible polynomial specication
providing evidence that the specication in (2) is exible enough to capture the non-linearity in the income-democracy
relationship.
6democracy (dit) but also income (yit). However, future shocks (vit+1;:::;viT) are not correlated
with neither current democracy nor current income. Therefore, we allow for a feedback eect from
changes in democracy to changes in income which seems to us a desirable property in the income
and democracy relationship.10 In order to accommodate the partial endogeneity assumption (4)
and given the dimensions of our panel dataset11 we resort to panel GMM estimators advanced by
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991).
The most important reason, but also the most controversial one, that justies our preference for
the Arellano-Bond estimator over withing-group, is the aim to give a causal interpretation to our
estimates, that is robust to feedback from democracy to income. However, this kind of estimators
is also interesting in this context because, as pointed out in Section 2, the measure of income used
in this study is likely to have measurement error. The within-group transformation may exacerbate
the attenuation bias due to measurement error while, under some conditions, panel GMM estimators
are robust to measurement error in regressors.12
3.2 Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the results when estimating equations (1) and (2) under strict exogeneity (i.e. Fixed
eects OLS) and partial endogeneity (i.e. Arellano-Bond GMM) using the panel of ve-year data.
First of all, in column (1) we report the estimates if xed eects (i) are not included in the model
so that the estimation technique is pooled OLS. In this case we observe a strong positive association
between income and democracy in levels as Lipset (1959) hypothesized. In contrast, column (2)
illustrates that once we control for country-specic eects and we only use within-country variation
this positive correlation clearly disappears (these two columns replicates columns 1 and 2 of Table
3 in Acemoglu et al. (2008)). This result would imply that during the post-war period, increases
in the income level were not associated with improvements in the democracy score across countries.
However, in column (3) we can appreciate evidence of a signicant non-linear association between
10In addition to strict exogeneity and partial endogeneity, there is also a third possible conguration labeled as
strict endogeneity in which democracy and income are correlated with the full path of shocks from t = 1 to T.
Estimating the model under this assumption would require the availability of additional country-specic time-varying
variables uncorrelated with past, present and future values of democracy but correlated with the income level. Given
the diculty and controversy of this task we prefer to work with the somehow less ambitious partial endogeneity
assumption.
11The panel dataset we consider for ten-year data has T = 4 and N = 107, so small T oriented estimators seem
to be more appropriate than other time-series oriented estimators such as Anderson and Hsiao (1982). Nevertheless
in the appendix we show that the non-linear eect of income on democracy is also found to be signicant using the
estimator proposed in Anderson and Hsiao (1982), see Table A1.
12Whenever measurement error is free of serial correlation, the panel dimension of the data is helpful for dealing
with attenuation bias because it provides internal instruments. The list of moments employed in the Arellano-Bond
estimator is only a subset of the list of moments available when there is measurement error in models with unobserved
xed heterogeneity. GMM estimators based on this type of moments were proposed by Griliches and Hausman (1986).
7changes in income and democracy after the sixties that somehow conrms the intuition of a positive
correlation in poor countries that vanishes after the y threshold.
Table 1: Linear vs. Quadratic Specication | Five-year data
Pooled Fixed Eects Arellano-Bond
OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is democracy
Democracy Index t 1 0:749 0:449 0:446 0:590 0:611
(0:034) (0:063) (0:059) (0:106) (0:094)
Log GDP per capita t 1 0:053  0:006 0:388  0:351 1:368
(0:010) (0:039) (0:210) (0:127) (0:401)
(Log GDP per capita t 1)2  0:024  0:082
(0:012) (0:022)
Fixed Eects NO YES YES YES YES
Time Eects YES YES YES YES YES
Income threshold (y) 8:08 8:34
Hansen J Test 0:03 0:02
AR(2) Test 0:39 0:33
Hausman Test 0:00 0:00
Observations 854 854 854 747 747
Countries 136 136 136 114 114
R-squared 0:77 0:82 0:82
Dependent variable is the Polity IV measure of democracy. Column (1) reports pooled cross-sectional
OLS without country-specic eects; columns (2) and (3) presents Fixed eects OLS regressions under
the strict exogeneity assumption of income and democracy; nally, in columns (4) and (5) we present
results when applying the panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ac-
commodates partial endogeneity of both democracy and income. The sample period is 1960-2000 at
ve-year intervals. The income threshold (y) is the (log) level of income per capita (at 1996 USD
PPP) beyond which the positive eect of income on democracy disappears. In all cases, standard
errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
In columns (4) and (5) we aim to give a causal interpretation to our estimates and we allow
for partial endogeneity of the income per capita variable. In particular, column (4) replicates the
result in Acemoglu et al. (2008) (column 4 of Table 3), taking into account the possible feedback
from democracy to income there is no evidence of a positive causal eect from income to democracy.
Nevertheless, by including a square term of the income variable in the model (column 5) we obtain
a signicant and non-linear eect of income on democracy. This is clear evidence in favor of our
hypothesis of heterogeneous eects across dierent levels of income. Below a certain level of wealth,
increases in income generate increases in democracy conrming the Lipset hypothesis, but only for
8poor countries.
Table 2 show results where the relationship between income and democracy is analyzed at lower
frequency by estimating similar regressions using the data over ten-year intervals. The results are
similar to those with ve-year data in Table 1. There is no evidence of a positive linear association
between income and democracy once the xed country heterogeneity is partialled out, but a positive
eect of income on democracy, exists only for low levels of income. Again, this pattern holds for
both xed-eects and rst dierenced GMM, but results are more conclusive when using the latter.
Hansen tests do not reject joint consistency of moment restrictions in any specication presented
in Table 1 (column 4 and 5) and Table 2 (column 4 and 5). AR(2) tests on residuals in the Arellano-
Bond GMM estimations indicate that there is no further serial correlation in both samples |at ve
or ten-year intervals| and for both specications |with and without the squared log-GDP|. In
addition, Hausman tests reject the null of equality between the coecients estimated by xed eects
OLS (ecient under the null) and Arellano-Bond GMM (consistent under the null but robust to
partial endogeneity) in both samples and in both specications. The null of equality of coecients
would be true if the exogeneity of income holds.13 This result supports our preference for estimators
robust to partial endogeneity of income such as Arellano-Bond GMM.
We also show in the Appendix that our results are robust to alternative estimation methods
and specications (Table A1), and to alternative sources of income data (see Table A2). In Table
A1 we consider the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator, a more exible polynomial specication,
a specication without lagged dependent variable and, nally, a simple segmented regression that
instead of the square term includes an interaction term between log GDP and a dummy variable for
rich countries. In all cases we obtain the same heterogeneous eect from income to democracy: in
poor countries, higher income is associated with higher democracy standards; however, this result
does not hold in rich countries.
4 The Problem of Many Weak Instruments
The intuition behind the panel GMM estimates presented in Tables 1 and 2 is that lagged levels
of the regressors are used as instruments for the same variables in rst dierences. Since income
is a persistent variable, its rst dierences might be weakly correlated with its lagged levels, which
implies that the relevance condition for validity of these instruments may be violated.14 Moreover,
the number of observations in the cross-section dimension (N) is small in this cross-country setting
13Fixed eects OLS produces ecient estimates related to Arellano-Bond GMM estimates because it is equivalent
to use all the available lags and leads as instruments.
14As illustrative evidence of this weak correlation, Table A3 in the appendix shows results from the rst stage
regressions of the rst dierence of income on some of the lags available in the data. The covariances of every lag of
income with the current rst dierence are not signicantly dierent from zero. On the other hand, as indicated by
the R-squared, less than 1 percent of the variation of the rst dierences of income is explained by each lag of income.
9Table 2: Linear vs. Quadratic Specication | Ten-year data
Pooled Fixed Eects Arellano-Bond
OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable is democracy
Democracy Index t 1 0:555 0:060 0:062 0:309 0:431
(0:052) (0:091) (0:079) (0:134) (0:127)
Log GDP per capita t 1 0:098 0:007 0:549  0:368 1:545
(0:017) (0:070) (0:326) (0:190) (0:523)
(Log GDP per capita t 1)2  0:033  0:090
(0:019) (0:030)
Fixed Eects NO YES YES YES YES
Time Eects YES YES YES YES YES
Income threshold (y) 8:32 8:58
Hansen J Test 0:01 0:08
AR(2) Test 0:38 0:75
Hausman Test 0:00 0:00
Observations 419 419 419 302 302
Countries 114 114 114 107 107
R-squared 0:64 0:77 0:77
Dependent variable is the Polity IV measure of democracy. Column (1) reports pooled cross-sectional
OLS without country-specic eects; columns (2) and (3) presents Fixed eects OLS regressions under
the strict exogeneity assumption of income and democracy; nally, in columns (4) and (5) we present
results when applying the panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ac-
commodates partial endogeneity of both democracy and income. The sample period is 1960-2000 at
ten-year intervals. The income threshold (y) is the (log) level of income per capita (at 1996 USD
PPP) beyond which the positive eect of income on democracy disappears. In all cases, standard
errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
and the rst stage coecients in the GMM framework proliferate as T increases. Under these
conditions, the rst-dierenced GMM estimator (Arellano-Bond) is poorly behaved (see Blundell
and Bond (1998) amongst others) because we have a setting with many weak instruments and small
samples.15
In order to further investigate this weak instruments problem in our framework, we repeat the
panel GMM estimation exercises in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2 but substituting the real instru-
ments (i.e. lagged levels of the regressors) by a set of random instruments completely independent
of the regressors. This technique was previously applied to the Angrist and Krueger (1991) data by
15Note that consistency of this estimator is based on xed-T and N ! 1, so that nite sample biases emerge due
to small N congurations, and worsen as T increases.
10Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995). It is striking that the results reported in columns (2) and (6) of
Table 3 look reasonable even with no information about the regressors in the randomly generated
instruments. The coecient estimates are similar to the estimates obtained with the real instruments
(lagged levels of the regressors) presented again in columns (1) and (5) of Table 3 for the sake of
comparison. In view of these results, it seems to be that the presence of (many) weak instruments
represents a problem in this particular application.
Table 3: The Problem of Many Weak Instruments
Estimation Method
Arellano-Bond sub-system Arellano-Bond sub-system
GMM LIML GMM LIML
Instrument for lagged random lagged random lagged random lagged random
di income income number income number income number income number
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy Index t 1 0:309 0:349 0:193 0:292 0:431 0:296 0:231 0:292
(0:134) (0:167) (0:085) (0:116) (0:127) (0:159) (0:086) (0:117)
Log GDP per capita t 1  0:368  0:311  0:043 0:000 1:545 1:294 1:169  0:000
(0:190) (0:232) (0:093) (0:101) (0:523) (0:844) (0:464) (0:012)
(Log GDP per capita t 1)2  0:090  0:088  0:068 0:005
(0:03) (0:044) (0:028) (0:014)
Income threshold (y) 8:58 7:35 8:60 0:01
Hansen J Test 0:01 0:01 0:08 0:02
AR(2) Test 0:38 0:41 0:75 0:33
Observations 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302
Countries 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
Dependent variable is the Polity IV measure of democracy. Columns (1) and (5) present the results when applying the panel
GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) using the real instrument for rst dierenced income, i.e. lagged level
of income (these are the same as columns (4) and (5) in Table 1. Columns (2) and (6) repeat the Arellano-Bond estimation
exercise but substituting lagged income by a random number as instrument for rst dierenced income. Columns (3), (4),
(7), and (8) present the results in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) respectively, but employing the sub-system LIML estimator
instead of rst-dierenced GMM. The sample period is 1960-2000 at ten-year intervals in all columns. The income threshold
(y) is the (log) level of income per capita (at 1996 USD PPP) beyond which the positive eect of income on democracy
disappears. In all cases, standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
In the single equation case, it is well documented in the literature that the eect of weak in-
struments on the distribution of two-stage least squares (2SLS) and limited information maximum
likelihood (LIML) diers substantially in nite samples despite the fact that both estimators have
the same asymptotic distribution. Although the distribution of LIML is centered at the parame-
ter value, 2SLS is biased toward ordinary least squares (OLS). Moreover, Anderson, Kunitomo and
Sawa (1982) concluded that LIML was to be strongly preferred to 2SLS, particularly if the number
of instruments is large. In the panel data setting considered in this paper, Monte Carlo evidence
provided in Moral-Benito (2011) illustrates that the recommendation in Anderson, Kunitomo and
Sawa (1982) for cross-sections is also true in our panel setting; despite both estimators are asymp-
11totically equivalent, sub-system LIML (i.e. the LIML counterpart of panel GMM estimators) seems
to be strongly preferred to rst-dierenced GMM in terms of nite sample16 performance when weak
instruments are present (see the Appendix for more details).
Results when employing the panel LIML estimator to estimate equations (1) and (2) are reas-
suring. In contrast to rst dierenced GMM, coecient estimates in columns (4) and (8) of Table
3 indicate that sub-system LIML is robust to the weak instrument problem previously discussed.
If randomly generated instruments are considered instead of real instruments, point estimates com-
pletely change becoming zero and the condence intervals are much wider, pointing to the lack of
information contained in the random instruments. Therefore, we consider the results in columns (3)
and (7) of Table 3 as our preferred estimates of the eect of income on democracy. This is so because
in addition to address partial endogeneity of the regressors, they alleviate the nite sample biases of
Arellano-Bond estimates due to weak instruments.
According to these results, there is no evidence of a linear (and homogeneous) eect of income on
democracy during the post-war period (Table 3, column 3). Note that the Arellano-Bond estimate of
the coecient of lag income, when the eect is assumed to be linear, is signicantly below zero. At a
dierent condence levels, this is true in most of results presented in Acemoglu et al. (2008). These
counter-intuitive results are consequence of the bias due to small sample size of the Arellano-Bond
estimator.
Although there is no signicant evidence of an homogeneous eect of income on democracy, in
column 7 of Table 3, we show evidence of a non-linear eect from income to democracy; income might
cause democracy at low levels of income per capita, but this eect vanishes at a certain threshold
level. In particular, if income per capita is higher than 5;431 PPP USD (exp(8:60) = 5;431) the
positive eect of income on democracy vanishes. Approximately 80 per cent of the country-year pairs
are below this threshold in our baseline sample.17 Countries such as Afghanistan, China or Libya
are always in the positive income-democracy eect region.
5 Concluding Remarks
It is well-known in the literature that income per capita is strongly correlated with the level of democ-
racy across countries. However, Acemoglu et al. (2008), controlling for factors that simultaneously
aect both income and democracy (i.e. country-specic xed heterogeneity), nd that there is not
evidence of a linear eect of income on democracy, supporting the idea that societies embarked on
divergent political-economic development paths at certain critical junctures in the distant past. In
this paper we revisit the evidence connecting both variables allowing for a more exible specica-
tion. We argue that the eect of income on democracy may be dierent for dierent levels of income.
16Note again that we are referring to xed-T, N ! 1 asymptotics so that nite sample biases arise because of
small N.
17This result motivates our partition of rich and poor countries in Figure 1.
12This might be because stability of institutions is highly correlated with economic performance (e.g.
North, 1990); therefore, democracy in poor countries with more fragile institutions will be aected
by changes in income. However, in rich countries institutions are more stable and thus changes in
income will not have any eect on the democracy level.
Using the same dataset as Acemoglu et al. (2008), we nd that income has a signicant non-linear
eect on democracy even after controlling for country-specic unobserved heterogeneity simultane-
ously aecting both variables. This eect is positive for lower values of income, but it vanishes
when income reaches a certain level. This result is robust to dierent econometric specications and
estimation techniques.
Our rst strategy is to partial out unobserved xed heterogeneity in a within-group regression.
Although xed-eects estimates conrm our hypothesis, there are good reasons to go beyond these
results. Fixed eects regressions in dynamic panels are biased when the number of time-series
observations is small. In addition, the indicator of income used is likely to suer from measurement
error and the attenuation bias is exacerbated when only within variation is exploited. Finally, there
might also be feedback eects from democracy to income, and hence income would be partially
endogenous to democracy. We also consider rst-dierenced GMM (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991)
and its likelihood-based counterpart. Both estimators are robust to the mentioned cases of partial
endogeneity but the latter one is expected to be preferred in terms of nite sample performance when
instruments are weak. Both sets of results give signicant evidence of a non-linear (causal) eect
from income to democracy; income might cause democracy at low levels of income per capita, but
this eect vanishes at a certain threshold level.
This evidence is relevant in the sense that it legitimates international policies toward poor coun-
tries with authoritarian regimes to encourage economic development, thereby hastening the eventual
replacement of authoritarian regimes with more democratic successors.
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15A Appendix
A.1 Likelihood-Based Estimation of Dynamic Panels
In the single equation, as stated in the main text, it is well-known that the eect of weak instruments
on the distribution of two-stage least squares (2SLS) and limited information maximum likelihood
(LIML) diers substantially in nite samples. One possible explanation for this result is that LIML
imposes a symmetric normalization of the coecients while the normalization implied by 2SLS is
non-symmetric (see Hillier (1990)).
Intuitively, the LIML model in the single equation case consists of the gaussian likelihood function
derived from the assumption of joint normality of the error terms in the structural and the reduced-
form equations conforming the 2SLS model. In the panel data case considered in this paper we
would have a set of structural form equations (one for each time period) and a set of reduced-form
equations (thus we can label the approach as sub-system LIML instead of simply LIML or Full
Information Maximum Likelihood | FIML |). In a recent paper, Moral-Benito (2011) writes down
this likelihood function for dynamic panels with partially endogenous regressors.18 In particular, the
structural equation in (1) is completed with an unrestricted feedback process which is specied in
the form of period-specic linear projections of the partially endogenous variables (lagged democracy
and log GDP per capita) on all available lags. Once the full set of equations is specied the likelihood
function is derived under normality of the shocks. It is important to remark here that the resulting
(pseudo) maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of non-
normality.
To be more precise, this (pseudo) maximum likelihood estimator is asymptotically equivalent
to the GMM estimator proposed in Arellano and Bond (1991) because the resultant rst order
conditions correspond to a GMM problem with a convenient choice of weighting matrix. On the
other hand, simulation experiments serve to evaluate the nite-sample behavior of this likelihood-
based estimator. In particular, results in Moral-Benito (2011) show that the estimator has negligible
biases in contrast to the commonly-used Arellano and Bond's (1991) GMM estimator, which might
have large biases in small samples, especially when the generated series are persistent over time. This
can be interpreted as a generalization of the result in Anderson et al. (1982) for the single equation
case.
18Likelihood-based approaches for dynamic panel models with unobservable individual eects and exogenous re-
gressors are well-known in the literature (e.g. Bhargava and Sargan (1983); Alvarez and Arellano (2003)). However,
these approaches do not consider settings with partially endogenous regressors.
16A.2 Additional Results
Table A1: Alternative Specications and Estimation Methods
Anderson-Hsiao Quartic No lagged Interaction
Estimator Specication Democracy Dummy
Sample Five-year Ten-year Five-year Ten-year Five-year Ten-year Five-year Ten-year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable is democracy (dt)
dt 1 0:723 0:590 0:400  0:031 0:125 0:155
(0:138) (0:205) (0:038) (0:066) (0:070) (0:084)
yt 1 2:273 4:028 65:10 64:25 0:547 0:944 0:127 0:126
(1:072) (1:830) (20:55) (36:60) (0:266) (0:441) (0:058) (0:062)
y2
t 1  0:101  0:181  12:80  13:30  0:034  0:057









Income threshold (y) 11:2 11:1 8:04 8:28 8:60 8:60
F-test 0:17 0:24
Observations 832 335 744 330 764 341 744 330
Dependent variable (dt) is the Polity IV measure of democracy. yt 1 corresponds to log GDP per capita, and Rt 1 is a dummy
variable for rich country-year pairs. In particular, Rt 1 takes the value 1 if the GDP per capita associated to a particular country-
period pair is above the 80 percentile of the empirical cross-sectional density of GDP per capita in period t 1. Columns (1) and (2)
report the estimates using the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) approach. In columns (3) and (4) we report the results when considering
a more exible polynomial specication which conrms the concave relationship between income and democracy obtained in the
main text with the quadratic specication. In columns (5) and (6) we drop the lagged dependent variable from the model in
equation (2) in the main text. Finally, columns (7) and (8) consider the interaction dummy specication in which we allow for a
dierent income-democracy eect for poor and rich countries by including a dummy for rich countries interacted with income. The
income threshold (y) is the (log) level of income per capita (at 1996 USD PPP) beyond which the positive eect of income on
democracy disappears. F-test reports the p-value of the null that sum of coecients on yt 1 and yt 1Rt 1 is zero (i.e. the eect
of income on democracy for rich countries is zero). In all cases, standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.
17Table A2: Results with Penn World Tables 6.3
Estimation Method
Fixed Eects Arellano-Bond sub-system
OLS GMM LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy Index t 1  0:01  0:01 0:30 0:49 0:59 0:62
(0:074) (0:076) (0:148) (0:145) (0:084) (0:123)
Log-GDP per Capitat 1  0:011 0:80  0:21 2:45  0:16 1:55
(0:072) (0:426) (0:172) (0:914) (0:073) (0:488)
(Log GDP per capita t 1)2  0:05  0:12  0:06
(0:026) (0:047) (0:027)
Hansen J Test 0:004 0:13
AR(2) Test 0:45 0:84
Observations 332 332 332 332 332 332
Countries 125 125 125 125 125 125
Dependent variable is the Polity IV measure of democracy. In columns (1) and (2) you can nd the xed eects estimates.
Columns (3) and (4) present the results when applying the panel GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Columns (5) and (6) present the results employing the sub-system LIML estimator instead of rst-dierenced GMM. The
sample period is 1960-2000 at ten-year intervals in all columns. A newer estimation of PPP-adjusted income provided
in the new version of Penn World Tables (i.e. PWT 6.3) is used as opposed to the chain index PPP-adjusted income.
This income measure is based on a constant price extrapolation of Domestic Absorption from 2005 to earlier and later
years. It uses the national growth rate of Domestic Absorption as the basis for the extrapolation. In all cases, standard
errors clustered by country are in parentheses.




Log GDP per capita at t
Log GDP per capita t 2  0:021
(0:020)
Log GDP per capita t 3 0:027
(0:025)
Log GDP per capita t 4 0:016
(0:063)
Constant 0:326  0:086 0:134
(0:165) (0:197) (0:487)
P-value of F-test 0:30 0:27 0:97
R-squared 0:004 0:006 0:001
Observations 493 332 166
Each column represents an univariate regression of rst-dierenced log-
income per capita on dierent lags of log-income per capita in levels. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the country level.
19